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Abstract 
This article analyses the dynamics of the urban geopolitics within the wider framework of permanently constructing the (more or 
less imagined) migration-(in)security nexus, which might have, at turn, its boomerang effects, leading to further security 
dilemmas. The role of immigrant networks is briefly sketched and then considered within the constructivist paradigm. Last, but 
not least, the case study illustrates the representational asymmetric interplay between the global network of Islamists and the 
urban one of PEGIDA.   
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1. Introduction 
Motto: “Power relations are rooted in the system of social networks.” (Foucault, 1982) 
“The most immediate source of self-recognition and autonomous organization is locality” (Castells, 2010). This 
locality can no longer be thoroughly homogenous in this age of movement and metamorphosis. “Thus, so emerged 
the [apparent] paradox of increasingly local politics in a world structured by increasingly global processes” 
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(Castells, 2010). And the main local targets for potential immigrants are the urban ones, primarily due to economic 
reasons. 
More than a mere topos, the urban space has become a modus vivendi, an embodiment of the (post)modern 
world, sometimes even a world in miniature, a space where diversity meets diversity, a metaphor of the so-called 
glocalization: “[t]he city, the contemporary metropolis, is for many the chosen metaphor for the experience of the 
modern world. In its everyday details, its mixed histories, languages and cultures, its elaborate evidence of global 
tendencies and local distinctions, the figure of the city, as both a real and an imaginary place, apparently provides a 
ready map for reading, interpretation and comprehension” (Chambers, 2001).  
Without entering the domain of urban studies too much, some aspects of urbanization connected to actual 
migration patterns need to be sketched for the comprehension of the migration-(in)security nexus, considering the 
fact that migration happens, above all, in cities and not in the remote rural areas.  
2. Considerations on Urban Geopolitics 
Since Antiquity, the city –with its various names, be it a polis in Greece or an urbe in the Roman empire, moving 
on to the Italian communes of the Middle Ages- has represented a key spatial element for trade, having, in time, a 
spillover effect on other plans, leading up to what Saskia Sassen has called ‘the global city’. Significantly surpassing 
their initially economic role, cities have become “political, economic and social agents” (Giddens, 2009). 
Max Weber’s posthumously published City analyses the urban environment from various perspectives, be they 
socio-economic, political, religious or administrative. Whereas, socially, a city can be characterized by anonymity, 
economically, “a city is always a market centre” (Weber, 1922). Worth emphasizing is Weber’s consideration of the 
city as “political community” (Weber, 1922), a key feature of the Western society - even that of Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages. The political community characteristic of the city is what Ferdinand Tönnies names Gemeinschaft –
German translation for ‘community’. Still, according to Tönnies, this Gemeinschaft- key feature of traditions, 
personal relations and feelings of neighbourhood, of belonging- has gradually been replaced by Gesellschaft- the 
German translation for ‘society’- the latter being based not on feelings of belonging, but on a rather instrumental 
association (Giddens, 2009), precisely because of this anonymity the urban environment offers as compared to the 
rural one. I argue that sometimes a Gesellschaft might embody various Gemeinschaften and, ultimately, turn into 
one, considering, of course, various vectors, among which the size is a crucial one. Megacities are not as likely to 
become a Gemeinschaft as cities of, for example, 300,000 inhabitants.  
More than half of world’s population – in 2014, 54%, according to UN statistics (UN, 2014) - lives in urban areas 
and Homi Bhabha’s ‘third space’ is essentially a metropolitan one. Furthermore, there is a proven tendency for the 
dynamics of urbanization to be perpetually augmented. Hence, the connection between migration and urbanization is 
worth considering.  
According to recent projections, “the world’s urban population is expected to double in the next 50 years, as 
developing countries reach levels of urban population- from 60 to 70 percent- that, until recently, were seen only in 
the rich world. Already, many of the world’s largest cities – Mumbai, Cairo, Calcutta, Jakarta, Lagos, Manila – are 
found in the world’s poorest countries” (Goldstone, 2012). On the other hand, in richer countries, various measures 
have been considered so as to avoid the gradual emptiness of rural areas; some governments have adopted policies 
to encourage immigrants to opt for villages and not cities, by financially stimulating them to sustain local 
development in non-urban regions, such as the Provincial Nominees Program in Canada.  
To these, the role of urban movements, analysed by Manuel Castells, has added a considerable amount of power, 
at least to the collective memory of the city. Furthermore, “urban movements and their discourses, actors and 
organizations have been integrated into the structure and practice of local government”, aspect which “has 
considerably reinforced [it] and introduced the possibility of the local state as a significant instance of reconstruction 
of political control and social meaning” (Castells, 2010). Even if the fundamental role of cities is widely 
acknowledged and “it is admitted that cities can and have to play a significant role in solving international political, 
economic and social problems” (Giddens, 2009), various debates arise that question its role and powers. A relevant 
example in this respect is Canada’s largest city, Toronto, which has approximately 2.8 million inhabitants (Toronto 
Facts). According to recent data, 15% of them – approximately 380,000 people – are permanent residents, which 
means they pay their local taxes and benefit from local services, but are not permitted to vote for local elections, 
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since they are not granted Canadian citizenship. According to Canadian law, permanent residents must have lived in 
Canada for at least three years before applying for Canadian citizenship, which might be, in turn, a relatively lengthy 
process (still short as compared to countries such as Switzerland, for instance). Given that “resident non-citizens can 
vote in municipal elections in some cities in more than 40 countries – including countries in Europe, as well as the 
U.S. and New Zealand” (Mah, 2013), much lobby has been done for the adoption of this right of a so-called ‘urban 
citizenship’. One could consider such actions as a re-construction of the Ancient city-state: “[t]he reinvention of the 
city-state is a salient characteristic of this new age of globalization, as it was related to the rise of a trading, 
international economy at the origin of the modern age” (Castells, 2010).  
Or, as Saskia Sassen has observed, one could talk about “an emerging urban geopolitics centered in networks of 
cities - mostly, but not exclusively, global cities. Major cities will not replace any of the other geopolitical actors. 
But they will play a role, both as actor and as the site for major challenges” (Sassen, 2012). 
In this age of high speed and rapid movement, “within global cities, a geography of ‘centrality and marginality’ is 
being [re]configured. Alongside with exuberant richness, there is an acute poverty. Still, even if these two worlds 
coexist, the real contact between them can be surprisingly reduced” (Giddens, 2009). 
Analyzing the demographic maps of various metropoles, one can notice that immigrants usually life at the 
outskirts, where they even have, in some cases, their own embodiments of communities, such as Chinatowns and 
various ‘villages’, regularly named after their pre-migratory nationality. Furthermore, as Hawley underlines, “the 
zones that are formed in urban areas develop not just as a consequence of spatial relations, but also of the temporal 
ones. […] The temporary order of people’s daily life reflects the hierarchy of the city’s districts and wards” (Hawley 
cited in Giddens, 2009). Still, this hierarchy determined by temporary order, has sometimes been significantly 
distorted by the so-called ‘newcomers’, as was the case in many colonized regions.  
Some immigrants are being ghettoized at the suburbs: “as suburbia grows and diversifies, the impact of suburban 
exclusion widens. The increasing heterogeneity of suburbia means that more and more suburbanities as well as city 
dwellers are affected by local policies which limit access to the growth of the metropolis” (Danielson, 1976). This 
might further lead to segregation in the detriment of integration, causing further imagined enmities that shall be 
analyzed in this article.  
3. Constructing the Migration-(In)Security Nexus 
The migration-(in)security nexus is from the very beginning a highly controversial one. Whereas some 
researchers state that there is no connection between the two components – to this category belonging, as well, 
various leaders of migrants’ think-tanks – others do claim the existence a consequential relationship between 
migration and security. To exemplify, whereas Thomas Faist states that “the links between international migration 
and security threats are inconclusive even after 9/11. Migration and security only superficially share the fact that 
border crossings are involved” (Faist, 2004) and Ratna Omidvar considers the very association of the two terms as 
highly discriminatory for immigrants, in the working paper “International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security 
Threat and the EU Response to this Phenomenon”, Anna Kicinger states that international migration might 
“threaten” social stability, demographic security, cultural identity, the social security system and welfare state 
philosophy, as well as internal security, primarily in terms of organized crime (Kicinger, 2004). It is also 
acknowledged that “the fight against all forms of irregular migration through various measures will remain the core 
of EU engagement” (Kicinger, 2004). There are also scholars who tend to favour the in-between position: 
“[u]sually, both things are true: members of some disadvantaged minority groups are disproportionately involved in 
kinds of crimes that result in convictions and prison sentences and the consequences of those differences are 
exacerbated by stereotyping and differential treatment” (Torny, 2014). Further examples shall be detailed in the two 
case studies. In all cases, “despite its organizational diversity, the inviolable symbolic unity of the state is invoked to 
justify the use of organized force against ‘enemies’ within and without its boundaries” (Finlayson & Martin, 2008), 
this being paralleled to Thomas Faist’s assumption on the meta-politics involved in this game of power towards 
rather imagined enemies. 
“Enemies are representations of the Other as actor that (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as 
autonomous human being and, consequently, (2) will not voluntarily limit violence”(Wendt, 2011). As emphasized 
118   Adrian Cosmin Basarabă and Maria-Mihaela Nistor /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  183 ( 2015 )  115 – 121 
by Wendt, not all enemies representations are legitimate. But it is not legitimacy that matters in representational 
issues: “reality or imagination, if actors do believe that enemies are real, then they are real in terms of 
consequences” (Thomas & Thomas cited in Wendt, 2011). At a certain point, “actors start treating enmity as a 
property of the system rather than one of individual actors and feel themselves obliged to represent all the Others as 
enemies, simply because they are part of the system. This way, a specific Other becomes what Mead has called a 
‘generalized Other’, a structure of collective expectations that persist in time, even if individual actors come and go; 
it is within this logic that new actors will be socialized” (Wendt, 2011).  
Another parallel can be drawn to the principle of “reflected evaluations” or “mirroring”, as explained by 
Alexander Wendt. This generates the hypothesis according to which actors perceive themselves as they believe the 
Others evaluate them, in the mirror of the Others’ representations about Themselves” (Wendt, 2011).  
“Constructivism underlines that the ideas of Ego about Alter, be they right or wrong, are not only passive 
perceptions about something that exists independently of Ego, but also on something that actively and continuously 
participates in constructing Alter’s role towards Ego” (Wendt, 2011). This might bear far-reaching implications on 
the effects of scapegoating immigrants.  
4. The Power of Networks 
Some immigrant-welcoming countries are believed to have indirectly nurtured terrorism by encouraging 
transnational immigration. This way, certain categories of immigrants’ remittances have contributed to the creation 
of weapons and to the facilitation of organized crime (Bell, 2007). This was primarily done by developing 
transnational networks, whose evolution is speeded up by globalization.  
With far-reaching implications for the migration-(in)security nexus is the ‘network society’, theorized by Manuel 
Castells. “For [Manuel] Castells, information and the rapidly changing information technology represent a unifying 
thread that connects the many globalization processes that happen in the contemporary world” (Jones, 2011). 
Among the criticism brought to the metaphor of ‘network’, it has been observed that “a poststructuralist critic could 
notice that relationing should find its place among Castells’ conception on the network-enterprise, network-
organization and social movements” (Jones, 2011), since “the concept of network suggests a greater separation of its 
nodes and fluxes” (Jones, 2011). 
Manuel Castells considers that “the network connects localities, at it also connects places that become symbolic 
sites of events and counter-events. The networking is both face-to-face and electronic” (Castells, 2010). The 
physical space is transcended by means of internet, so networks are not necessary geographically delimited from one 
another, since “e-mailing lists, chat rooms, forums and the posting of information and statements made the internet a 
permanent agora” (Castells, 2010). To synthetize, the network can even be considered a microcosm that requires 
attentive management and an in-depth analysis of its components and the multi-level connections that exist at both 
intra- and internetwork levels.  
Transnational networks are linked by the feeling of belonging, forming transnational communities that may 
permanently tighten themselves, despite being spread all over the world. Should these communities be represented 
as a potential danger for the positive development urban geopolitics, as a threatening “Other”, other communities 
might contextually tighten themselves – being, as Thomas Faist has stated, more or less engaged in metapolitics – so 
as to diminish or even annihilate the potential danger, having a boomerang effect on the migration-(in)security 
nexus and, ultimately, leading to further security dilemmas.  
5. Case Study: the urban geopolitics of constructing the migration-(in)security nexus in Dresden 
The fact that some West-European Muslims are temporarily going back to their home societies to get radicalized 
is not new. What is striking is the rising frequency of such actions. “In 2013, France counted about 13,000 Salafists 
in its Muslim population, Germany around 4,500. And in the UK, the numbers are growing by the day. For jihadi 
recruiters and those working to spread the Salafist and other extremist messages, the war in Syria provides a perfect 
narrative, the connection they exploit to reach out to and radicalize Western Muslim youth even in their homelands 
– whether they actually go fight or not” (Esman, 2014). This has further led to a revival and consolidation of right-
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extremist movements in European countries and the results in favour of these parties at the May 2014 elections for 
the European Parliament are a living proof in this respect. 
According to 2013 official estimations (Bevölkerung - Entwicklung der Einwohnerzahl), there are 80.77 million 
persons living in Germany, out of which 4.25 million Muslims (Fakten zum Thema). Sometimes a transfer of image 
is created from Islam to Islamism and all Muslims are imagined potential enemies of the Western culture. 
Huntington’s statement that “the Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such 
challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to 
propagate the values, customs and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is notable among the Muslims 
in Europe” (Huntington, 2011) is a proof in this respect.  
This is one of the main reasons for the permanent need for distinction between Islam and Islamism: “Islam, a 
religion, cannot be turned into a handmaiden of politics; when this occurs, Islam is turned into Islamism. Its defining 
characteristic is its intolerance of others, including Muslims, and glorification of violence against all who disagree” 
(Mansur, 2013). Or, according to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz), “Islamism is the misuse of Islam for the political purposes of Islamists”. As revealed by the 
data of the above-mentioned Office, at the end of 2013 there were 30 active Islamist organizations and the “Islamist 
potential” acknowledged so far has considerably grown from 38,080 in 2011 to 42,550 in 2012 and even to 43,190 
in 2013. This means a rapid evolution of the Islamist network or, more precisely, community in Germany.  
To these more or less imagined threats, Germans themselves have not remained passive, this leading, as 
previously stated in the theoretical part of this article, to the boomerang effect and, further on, to security dilemmas 
that would further construct the migration-(in)security nexus. This are primarily oriented towards annihilating 
potential threats and preserving the security of the urban geopolitics.  
A relevant example in this respect is constituted by the protests in Dresden that led to the formation of PEGIDA 
(Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes in original), Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the West.  
It must be emphasized that Dresden is relatively small city, which had at the end of 2013 535,810 inhabitants†, 
representing approximately 15% of Berlin’s population. Dresden, capital city of Saxony, has approximately 0.1% 
Muslims (Dearden, 2014). PEGIDA was formed in October 2014 and its members and supporters protested every 
Monday on the streets against Islamism. Worth underlining is that the founder of PEGIDA, who managed to 
mobilize people especially on-line, is himself a controversial figure. Lutz Bachmann, a former cook, had been 
imprisoned for robbery for approximately three years and also accused of drug trafficking‡.  
PEGIDA organizers managed to gather on the streets – according to the information note of the Dresden Police 
dated December 22nd 2014 - “approximately 17500 people”. Having in view the fact that there are relatively few 
Muslims in Saxony and in other former German Democratic Republic provinces and that this mobilization was 
before the Charlie Hebdo attack, these impressive number represent the embodiment of constructing a migration-
security nexus and of civil engagement in what Thomas Faist called ‘metapolitics’.  
After Charlie Hebdo attacks, the protests augmented, as expected, leading to 25,000 people marching on the 
streets of Dresden on January 12th 2015 (BBC, 2015). At the same time, the boomerang effect became noticeable as 
the civil society started a series of counter-protests, leading to the further division of the Germans: in Dresden the 
25,000 protesters met 8,700 counter-protesters (Die Zeit, 2015) who pleaded for tolerance. On the other side, 
apparently paradoxically, in München, where-, the number of Muslims is round 100,000, representing a percentage 
much greater than the one in Dresden - the PEGIDA protesters were approximately 1,500, whereas the counter-
protesters were estimated by Die Zeit reporters to 18,000. 
 
 
† Statistik in Dresden, http://statistik-dresden.de/archives/tag/einwohner.  
‡ “Der vorbestrafte Kopf von PEGIDA”, in tagesschau.de, 15.12.2014, http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/lutz-bachmann-101.html. 
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6. Conclusion 
In the wider context of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the fear of terrorism has considerably augmented. Analysing 
these actions in progress for the time being, it can be observed that, beside the represented conflict and its inherent 
protests of segments of the German population against Islamism and radicalization, a further division of “camps” 
appears. Hence, the German civil society is itself segregated into PEGIDA protesters and counter-protesters or, even 
more generically, into two ideologically divided (imagined) communities, to use the concept of Ferdinand Tönnies. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis of Manuel Castells that urban movements have considerably reinforced the local 
state as an “instance of political control and social meaning” is confirmed once more. At the same time, this ‘local 
state’, is subject to changing geopolitics and might lead to further tensions between a community of an Ego and that 
of an Alter, as it has been emphasized in the case study under discussion.  
The power of networks can be underlined in case of the Islamists that inoculate fear in the Western society, 
focusing on terrorism, Germany being no exception here, as well as in that of the civil society that reacts and 
counter-reacts to these more or less imagined threats by being further divided.  
Whereas Islamists belong to a wider transnational, even global network, PEGIDA can be considered an example 
of urban network rapidly risen out of perceptions and representations related to the wider migration-(in)security 
nexus, leading to various security dilemmas within the German society and not only. 
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